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Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal
Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for
Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents
MELANIE B. JACOBSt
The tanker truck barreled through a blind intersection on a
country road near Oklahoma City and smashed broadside into
Nancy Springer's blue Subaru.
Nancy survived for only a few minutes. Her thirteen year-old
son, Micah... [was] airlifted to a nearby hospital.
Micah had no father, but he told the hospital authorities
repeatedly that he did have another mother-Nancy's former
partner, who lived in Berkeley [California].
No one listened. No one dialed the phone numbers in California
he kept giving them. Before Micah was taken to surgery for a
badly broken left arm, he was already a ward of the court and on
his way to becoming a foster child.
Micki Graham heard about the accident late that night when a
Berkeley cop knocked on her door with the number of a children's
hospital chaplain in Oklahoma.
"Mom," Micah said as Micki swept into his hospital room [the
next] afternoon. 'Tou got here."
But a judge had ruled six years earlier that, in the eyes of the
law, Micki Graham wasn't mom. Now, in an Oklahoma hospital,
that ruling meant that as soon as Micah was well enough, some
couple would be taking him.
1
t Abraham L. Freedman Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Temple
University School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Nancy Knauer and
Richard Greenstein for their insightful comments on earlier drafts, Professor
Barbara Cox for her thoughtful suggestions, and Jessica VanderVeen for her
research assistance. I offer special thanks to Susan and Mark Jacobs and
Charla McMillian for their love and encouragement. Copyright © 2002 Melanie
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1. Elaine Herscher, Family Circle, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1999, at 1Z1
(recounting the facts underlying the case of Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal.
Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991)). For further discussion of Nancy S., see infra Part
III.B. 1.
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INTRODUCTION
Micah represents one of approximately ten million
children being raised by same-sex parents in the United
States.2 While our country is undergoing a "gayby boom"
and a growing number of children will be raised in "two
mommy" households, our laws have not caught up with
societal reality. Many lesbian couples are having children;
but courts consider a child born to both a biological lesbian
mother and a nonbiological lesbian mother ("lesbian
coparent"4) to have one legal parent and one legal
stranger.6 Even though these lesbian couples jointly make
the decision to have children, the party who is artificially
inseminated is a legal parent because of her biological tie,
while the other party has no legal parental role because of
her lack of biological connection to the child.7
This article addresses the status of a lesbian coparent
who has made a decision with her partner to form a family,
who often has participated in the artificial insemination
process, and who has functioned in all ways as a parent, but
2. According to recent estimates by the American Bar Association, as many
as ten million children within the United States currently live in families with
same-sex parents. Valerie Kellogg, How the Children of the Gay Baby Boom Are
Faring, NEWSDAY, July 10, 2001, at B10.
3. See id.; see also Ilene Chaykin, Are Two Moms Better Than One?, Los
ANGELES MAG., July 1, 2000 at 105 (discussing the unprecedented number of
lesbian and gay parents).
4. I use the term "lesbian coparent" to refer to a nonbiological or
nonadoptive mother who is the committed, lesbian partner of a child's biological
parent, who has fully participated in the decision to create a family, and who
has functioned as a parent to the child.
5. The term "parent" has traditionally been defined through biology or
adoption. Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the
New ALI Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769, 771 (1999).
6. See id. at 770-72. Shapiro notes that within the dualistic realm of parent
and non-parent, a non-parent is often treated by courts as a legal stranger. Id.
at 770.
7. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 508 (1990) ("A legally unrecognized
lesbian mother is currently forced into the legal status of nonparent, or third
party, in custody or visitation disputes."). Thus, lesbian coparents, who have
formed a family with the encouragement and agreement of their partner, are
viewed as third parties-such as grandparents, aunts and uncles, stepparents,
or foster parents-and not as a second parent, as in paternity or divorce cases.
See also Karen Markey, Note, An Overview of the Legal Challenges Faced by
Gay and Lesbian Parents: How Courts Treat the Growing Number of Gay
Families, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 721, 723 (1998).
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lacks legal recognition of her parenthood under existing
laws.' Most courts currently employ third party visitation
doctrine9 rather than a parental analytical framework when
deciding custodial and visitation disputes involving a
lesbian coparent. But this doctrine disadvantages lesbian
coparents and is inadequate to meet their needs. I propose
that courts use instead a statutory parental analytic
framework-specifically, the Uniform Parentage Act
("UPA" or the "Act")°-to adjudicate maternity for lesbian
coparents, thereby conferring all of the rights and privileges
of legal parenthood. Only by doing so will courts be able to
fully protect the relationship between a child and her
lesbian coparent.
Recently, several courts have used equitable doctrines
to maintain contact between lesbian coparents and their
children, but those doctrines are inferior to the use of the
Uniform Parentage Act. Part I of this article discusses in
greater detail the existing dilemmas faced by many lesbian
coparents, as well as provides background on the UPA and
the potential for use of the UPA's maternity adjudication
8. I have chosen to focus my analysis on this narrow class because much of
the existing case law and literature concerns these women. There are many
other same-sex parent paradigms that are beyond the scope of this piece. For
example, this article does not examine the issues involving lesbian couples in
which one woman is the gestational mother and her partner is the genetic
mother. See, e.g., Ryiah Lilith, Note, The G.I.F.T. of Two Biological and Legal
Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 207 (2001). Furthermore, I have
chosen to focus on lesbian coparents rather than gay coparents because of the
different legal issues involved; for example, an unknown sperm donor has no
parental rights, whereas the parental status of a surrogate mother may be less
clear. While the Uniform Parentage Act may arguably be used to adjudicate
parentage within a multi-parental framework, see, e.g., Theresa Glennon,
Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 57 (discussing Louisiana's recognition of three
legal parents through acknowledgment of dual paternity, as well as decisions in
two other states which appear similarly to open the door to recognition of dual
paternity), this article uses a two-parent model to explore UPA application to a
same-sex coparent.
9. Third party visitation doctrine is predicated on the notion that a child has
one mother and one father and that any other person occupies the less
privileged legal position of third party.
10. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 3, 21 (1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 106,
201, 602 (2000). The UPA was originally promulgated in 1973 ("UPA 1973"),
and substantially revised in 2000 ("UPA 2000"). Only Texas, however, has
adopted UPA 2000. See 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 821. The provisions of UPA 1973
are analyzed within this article's text; where appropriate, a brief analysis of
UPA 2000 is provided in accompanying footnotes.
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provision to address the problems. Through a series of case
studies, Part II reviews the current jurisprudential trend of
using third party equitable doctrines such as de facto and
psychological parent as a basis of affording a lesbian
coparent access to her child upon termination of a
relationship with her child's biological mother. Part II
further analyzes the deficiencies inherent in those equitable
doctrines for establishing maternity and for clarifying
standing. Part III examines both the statutory language of
the UPA and cases involving the UPA to illustrate that the
UPA can and should be used to adjudicate lesbian coparent
maternity, thereby conferring upon lesbian coparents full
parental rights. This article concludes that the UPA
provides the most consistent method for resolving disputes
between lesbian coparents and their former same-sex
partners and the most expedient and reliable method for
legalizing a full parental relationship for lesbian coparents
with their children.
I. BACKGROUND
Parenthood is most often legally determined by biology
or adoption. 1 Furthermore, a child born to married parents
is considered to have two legal parents. 2 Since same-sex
couples cannot marry, two lesbians in a committed
relationship, unlike their heterosexual counterparts, are
not both considered the legal parents of a child born to their
union." Although a growing number of states permit a
11. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 771.
12. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204
(2000).
13. No states currently permit same-sex partners to marry and thirty-five
states expressly forbid it. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Map of
Specific Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Laws in the U.S.-June 2001 (2001), available
at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/marriagemap0601.gif (last accessed Dec. 8,
2001); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1) (West. Supp. 2001) ("Marriages
between persons of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction ... or
relationships between persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages
in any jurisdiction... are not recognized for any purpose in this state."); MICH.
COMP. LAWS Ann. § 551.1 (West Supp. 2001) ("Marriage is inherently a unique
relationship between a man and a woman.... A marriage contracted between
individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state."); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1102 (West 2001) (defining marriage as "[a] civil contract by which one man and
one woman take each other for husband and wife"). However, Vermont's new
civil union law operates in the same way as its marriage law and legalizes the
parental relationship between a lesbian coparent and her child:
344 [Vol. 50
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lesbian coparent to adopt the biological child of her partner
(same-sex second parent adoption), thus legalizing the
parental status of the lesbian coparent, many states still do
not, thus limiting the ability of a lesbian coparent to be
considered the child's legal parent.14 In states that do not
recognize second parent adoptions by a same-sex partner, a
lesbian coparent generally has no mechanism by which she
can establish her legal parenthood. 5 Moreover, even in
states that do offer same-sex second parent adoption, not all
eligible parties avail themselves of the opportunity," and a
lesbian coparent may have no legal rights to continue her
relationship with her child when the relationship termin-
ates. Thus, children like Micah are routinely separated
from a lesbian coparent who has nurtured and loved them
because she is not a legal parent and has little legal
recourse to protect her parental relationship. As Micah's
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom
either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union,
shall be the same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child
of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the
marriage.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (Supp. 2000).
14. Compare In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding
that lesbian could adopt her life-partner's biological children), and In re
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (same), with Angel Lace M. v.
Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (denying lesbian's petition to adopt her
life-partner's child). One author further notes:
More than 20 states have formally recognized second-parent adoption
and others have allowed such adoptions in individual cases, without
ruling on the practice generally. Wisconsin, Ohio and Colorado have
rejected second-parent adoptions. Furthermore, Florida, Mississippi
and Utah do not allow same-sex couples to adopt children [and]
Arkansas law prohibits gays from becoming foster parents.
John Leland, State Laws Vary, But a Broad Trend Is Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2000, at F4.
15. Although several states recognize a form of de facto or psychological
parent to enable lesbian coparents to maintain contact with their children,
these doctrines have been employed as a visitation tool and have not resulted in
an adjudication of maternity. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000)
(finding that lesbian coparent was a psychological parent to twins and was
properly awarded visitation with the children).
16. For instance, in several of the cases discussed herein, the parties had
discussed second-parent adoption but had not finalized the process-perhaps
because, like many couples, they did not foresee the imminent termination of
their relationship. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 544; E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,
711 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1999). Furthermore, many lesbian couples may be
concerned about perceived homophobia or may be unfamiliar with the legal
system and thus do not avail themselves of this option.
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story illustrates, the consequences for a child who is
separated from his lesbian coparent can be absolutely
devastating.
The failure to treat a lesbian coparent as a legal parent
denies her the full spectrum of parental rights that she has
voluntarily assumed, and simultaneously disadvantages
her child. Legal parenthood confers many rights and
responsibilities on a parent, and affords a child many
benefits.17 Statutes in every state provide for the custody,
support, and maintenance of children born to heterosexual
parents, whether married or unmarried.18 Moreover, an
adjudication of legal parentage under the UPA entitles a
child to receive child support,19 qualify as a dependent on
her parent's health insurance, collect Social Security
benefits from her parent,2 sustain an action for wrongful
death," recover under a state worker's compensation law,23
and in many states, to inherit from her parent. 4 Persons
17. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989).
18. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 573 (1998); id. §§ 402, 407, 9A U.L.A. 298, 398; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§
15-18 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 465-66, 486-87 (2001).
19. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that children born out of
wedlock are constitutionally entitled to the same right to support as afforded to
children of married parents).
20. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Funches, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49
(Ct. App. 1999) (affirming trial court's decree in paternity suit mandating a
monthly award of child support and health insurance coverage for his child);
Martinez v. Agostini, 579 So.2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Pensa v.
Sklinor, 547 So.2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same); In re C.D.D., No. 04-98-
01023-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2522 (Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2000) (affirming trial
court's judgment declaring paternity and ordering father to pay support and
health insurance for his child); In re Perez, No. 04-95-00724-CV, 1997 Tex. App.
LEXIS 736 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1997) (same); De La Gorza v. Salazor, 851 S.W.2d
380 (Tex. App. 1993) (same).
21. See, e.g., Zahradnik v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding
petitioner had established paternity for purposes of inheriting Social Security
benefits under 42. U.S.C. § 416 (h)(2)(A)); Barton v. Sullivan, 774 F. Supp. 1151
(S.D. Ind. 1991) (same); Donaldson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 567 F.
Supp. 166 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Burrus v. Heckler, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16136 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1985) (finding child born out of wedlock eligible for
Social Security benefits where no evidence negated presumption of paternity).
22. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (ruling that Louisiana's Wrongful
Death Act violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying recovery to a
nonmarital child for the death of the mother).
23. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Brady v. Smith, No. E2000-01880-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 230 (Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2001) (finding children born out of-wedlock
sufficiently established deceased father's paternity by DNA evidence and were
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who are not deemed legal parents often cannot provide
these important benefits for a child with whom they have a
parent-like relationship.25  Lesbian coparents who are
denied recognition of their parental status thus not only
lose out on custodial benefits, their children are denied
much of the financial security that other children with two
parents receive as a matter of course.26
Legal parenthood also has many intangible benefits.
Without an adjudication of parentage, lesbian coparents
have no legal authority to make important medical or
educational decisions for their children,27 or to influence
religious or moral decisions.2 8 From a child's perspective,
the absence of lesbian coparent maternity adjudication may
deny her the love, nurture, and guidance of a person with
whom she has developed a parental bond. Through custody
and visitation statutes, 9 legal parent status ensures for
both parent and child the possibility of an ongoing
emotional relationship. Unfortunately, lesbian coparents
who seek to preserve their parental relationship with the
child that they have helped raise, after the termination of
their romantic relationship with the child's mother or after
the biological lesbian mother dies, are often precluded from
doing so because the law fails to recognize their parental
status.0
entitled to inheritance); Malone v. Thomas, 24 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App. 2000)
(affirming trial court's determination that child established deceased father's
paternity and was entitled to inheritance).
25. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989) (declining to
declare biological father as child's legal parent and denying father any parental
rights with respect to the rearing of his biological child).
26. See id.
27. See id.; see also N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo. 2000) ("The
determination of parenthood includes the right to parenting time; the right to
direct the child's activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control,
education, and health of the child; and the right to the child's services and
earnings.").
28. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118-19; N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 359 ("Legal
[parenthood] imposes significant obligations ... including ... the obligation to
teach moral standards, religious beliefs, and good citizenship.").
29. Both paternity and divorce statutes contain custody and visitation
provisions to ensure that, in the absence of egregious behavior on the part of
one parent, both parents can continue to actively participate in the parenting
process. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 15 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 465-66 (2001); UNIF.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 407 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 398 (1998).
30. See, e.g., Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1999) (holding that
lesbian coparent had no standing to proceed with visitation claim because
psychological parent is not entitled to status equivalent to biological parent and
2002] 347
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For lesbian coparents, attempts to gain legal
recognition as parents are often unsuccessful.31 Federal and
state law give significant deference to legal parents, thereby
enabling a lesbian biological mother to bar her former
partner and lesbian coparent from any involvement with
the child. 2 Many courts will not even entertain a lesbian
coparent's petition for custody or visitation because a
woman lacking a biological connection to her child is often
deemed to lack standing to initiate court proceedings." As
Professor Rubenstein observed, "this is true
notwithstanding the fact that biology may mean less in a
family in which the child is the product of some form of
alternative insemination and in which the genetic
connection may not correlate, even loosely, with the
provision of day-to-day care for the growing child."
34
The problem of standing illustrates that the lesbian
coparent cases exist against a backdrop of longstanding
parental autonomy. Parents have long enjoyed considerable
autonomy concerning how they raise their children 5 and
the Supreme Court has consistently held that parental
rights should not be lightly intruded upon by third parties.36
thus cannot overcome constitutional right to privacy hurdle); Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that lesbian coparent was not a
legal parent under state statute and that third party equitable doctrine could
not apply to lesbian coparent such that she would be enabled to interfere with
biological mother's constitutional right to custody and control of her child).
31. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991);
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27.
32. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr at 216-17; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29. It
has not escaped notice that it is reprehensible that lesbian biological parents
use anti-gay sentiment and law to prevent their ex-partners from continued
contact with their children. See Polikoff, supra note 7, at 542.
33. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Propagate: An Introduction to
Protecting Families: Standards for Child-Custody in Same-Sex Relationships,
10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 146 (1999).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weiss, Nonparent Visitation Rights v. Family
Autonomy: An Abridgement of Parents' Constitutional Rights?, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 1085 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (finding
unconstitutionally broad a Washington state statute which permitted any
person to petition the court for visitation rights at any time and further allowed
the court to order visitation rights for any such person when visitation served
the best interests of the child, but did not adequately require that petitioners
demonstrate a substantial relationship with the child nor that courts consider
the parents' reason(s) for limiting visitation); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
[Vol. 50348
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Third party visitation doctrine is predicated on the notion
that a child has one mother and one father and that any
other person occupies the less privileged legal position of
third party. Thus, third parties-including, among others,
grandparents, stepparents, foster parents, and other
relatives-are restricted in their ability to interact with a
child against the legal parent's wishes, because to permit
third parties unrestricted access to a child would violate the
parent's constitutional rights of parental autonomy and
privacy. 7
In their attempts to seek legal recognition of their
parenthood and to maintain contact with their children,
lesbian coparents have been treated as third parties.38 Like
other third parties, when a lesbian coparent seeks ongoing
custody and visitation with the biological child of her same-
sex partner, she is often unsuccessful in overcoming the
constitutional principles of parental autonomy and
privacy.39 Traditionally, a third party could only assert a
claim for custody of a nonbiological child if she could
establish that the biological parent was unfit.4 ° In lesbian
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty interest
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to "establish a
home and bring up children" without state interference).
37. See Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1385 (1994).
38. Courts have increasingly used third party visitation doctrines such as
psychological and de facto parent to preserve visitation between a lesbian
coparent and her child, but not as a way to adjudicate the lesbian coparent's
maternity. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (finding that
lesbian coparent was a psychological parent to twins and was properly awarded
visitation with the children); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999)
(holding that lesbian coparent was a de facto parent and probate court properly
entered order permitting visitation between lesbian coparent and child).
39. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. 2000). In upholding
a biological mother's right to maintain full custody and control of her children
in accordance with constitutional principles, the court stated:
While Tennessee's legislature has generally conferred upon parents the
right of custody and control of their children, it has not conferred upon
[a lesbian coparent] any right of visitation. Absent any statutory
authority establishing such a third-party's right to visitation, parents
retain the right to determine with whom their children associate.
Id. (citation omitted).
40. An allegation of parental unfitness may overcome the general
presumption that a parent has a fundamental right to the care and custody of
her child. See, e.g., V.C., 748 A.2d at 548-49 ("[Ihf there is a showing of
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
coparent cases, however, the biological parent is ordinarily
not unfit, thereby rendering the lesbian coparent
petitioner's claim for custody meritless.41
Unfortunately, by categorizing lesbian coparents as
mere third party petitioners or "legal strangers," courts
overlook the actual parental relationship that has been
established. Lesbian coparents are anything but third
parties-they are involved, nurturing, loving, and
supportive parents. Lesbian coparents are different from
traditional third parties because they intend and plan, with
their partner's agreement and encouragement, to be a
parent. Lesbian coparents thus actively participate in the
decision to create a family and, indeed, function as parents.
But, because under existing law and court practice lesbian
coparents are not protected by state divorce or parentage
statutes, they are denied legal recognition of their actual
parental role."
Through categorization alone, many courts have
deemed lesbian coparents something "other than" or "less
than" parents and approach the issue of lesbian coparenting
from a third-party perspective rather than a second-parent
perspective.43 In typical paternity disputes,44 courts do not
treat the putative father45 as a mere third party-rather,
they treat the putative father as the child's other parent,
unfitness, abandonment or gross misconduct, a parent's right to custody of her
child may be usurped."); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 ("[So long as a
parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally
be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to
further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning
the rearing of that parent's children.").
41. See, e.g., Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. 1998) (requiring
unfitness, abandonment, or extraordinary circumstances before terminating
parental rights).
42. Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and Parenthood: Models for Legal
Recognition of Nontraditional Families, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 127, 131-32 (1997).
43. See generally Robson, supra note 37.
44. By typical paternity dispute, I refer to the situation in which only two
parents, one mother and one father, are parties to the action. This is in contrast
to a situation in which three potential parents, one mother and two fathers, are
involved. For a discussion of this "atypical" paternity dispute, see infra Part
III.A.
45. "Putative father" is defined as "the alleged or reputed father of a child
born out of wedlock." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990). As discussed
below, a putative father may have no biological connection whatsoever to the
child for whom he may be adjudicated the legal parent. See infra Part III.A.
350 [Vol. 50
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within a parental analytic framework.46 For example, in
adjudicating paternity disputes, courts do not resolve by
piecemeal decision-making a part of the parental dispute-
such as visitation-but resolve the entire bundle of parental
rights, including custody, visitation, child support, health
insurance, and parentage adjudication. The paradigm of
traditional third party doctrine disadvantages a lesbian
coparent: it categorizes her as a "legal stranger" and
thereby distances her from the parental framework.
Rather than applying third party visitation doctrine as
a piecemeal remedy for lesbian coparents, courts should
instead use a parental analytic framework-specifically, the
Uniform Parentage Act-to adjudicate maternity for lesbian
coparents. Just as nonbiological fathers can, and do, obtain
parentage adjudications under the UPA,47 lesbian coparents
should also be able to obtain legal declarations of
parentage. The text of the Act lends itself to such an
application, as the UPA includes a provision for a
declaration of maternity.48
Using the UPA would enable courts to legalize the
relationship between children and their lesbian coparents
by properly placing lesbian coparents within the parental
framework and thus allowing them (and their children) to
realize all of the benefits discussed above. In fact, the UPA's
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 302 (2001). A putative father
has a clear basis for standing upon which to bring his claim; courts require him
to prove his parenthood, but do not require him to master the standing or
jurisdictional gymnastics that lesbian coparents, as third party legal strangers,
are required to perform. Id.
47. See discussion infra Part III.A.
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 334 (2001); see infra notes
165-67 and accompanying text. Fourteen states have adopted the UPA 1973
provision that would allow for adjudication of maternity. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-
17-4, 26-17-18 (1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-4-104 (West 1999); HAW. REV. SWAT. §§ 584-1 to 584-21 (1993); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4, 45/19 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.819, 210.848
(West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-104, 40-6-121 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 126.041, 126.071 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-
4, 40-11-21 (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-03, 14-17-20 (1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.02, 3111.17 (Anderson 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-8-26
(2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.030, 26.26.170 (West 1997); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-2-101, 14-2-118 (Michie 2001). Additionally, three non-UPA states
have similar provisions that would allow for adjudication of maternity. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-803 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, §
21 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-45 (West 1993). UPA 2000 similarly
contains a provision permitting maternity adjudication. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §
106 (2000).
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maternity provision has been used by at least one state's
supreme court as the procedural basis upon which to hear a
lesbian coparent dispute, 9 and lower courts in several
states have used the UPA's maternity 'provision to
adjudicate maternity for a lesbian coparent. While only
eighteen states have adopted the UPA's maternity
provision, all states should consider adopting the provision:
Maternity adjudication under the UPA offers the most
consistent method of legitimizing the lesbian coparent/child
relationship and best protects a lesbian coparent and her
child.5
Moreover, when the UPA was promulgated more than
thirty years ago, the drafters sought to protect equally the
rights of children born to unmarried heterosexual parents
and those of children born to married heterosexual
parents." The legislation was prompted by concerns for the
unjust financial and emotional ramifications associated
with having only one legal parent. 3 Yet the concerns today
for children born to unmarried lesbian parents are the same
as those for children born of unmarried heterosexual
parents thirty years ago: children need the financial and
emotional security that comes with having two parents.
And parents need the security that comes with having the
enforceable legal rights of parenthood.
Using the UPA to adjudicate maternity would resolve
much of the murkiness that now exists in lesbian coparent
disputes. Courts would be able to use the UPA to confer all
of the rights and responsibilities of parenthood upon lesbian
coparents-as is typical in paternity cases-both after the
dissolution of a lesbian relationship and prior to such
49. See Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
50. See Shannon Minter & Kate Kendell, Beyond Second-Parent Adoption:
The Uniform Parentage Act and the "Intended Parents"--A Model Brief, 2 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 29, 32-33 (2000). The authors note that California and Colorado
trial courts and a Massachusetts probate court have all granted parentage
decrees to lesbian coparents under the UPA. Id. at 33 nn.27-28 (citing In re
Twin A & Twin B, No. 99 JV (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1999) and M.K. & C.P. v. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., No. OOW 1343 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. 2000)).
51. Using the UPA to adjudicate maternity is suggested as a preferred
alternative to same-sex second parent adoption, which accomplishes the same
goal, because UPA maternity adjudication is faster and less expensive than an
adoption and begins from the premise that the nonbiological mother is, in fact,
the child's parent. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
52. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 289 (2001).
53. Id. at 288.
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dissolution." Additionally, the UPA provides a clear,
consistent basis of standing to lesbian coparents for parent
custody and visitation disputes. Third party equitable
doctrines such as de facto parenthood and psychological
parenthood can be employed within the parental framework
of the UPA to adjudicate maternity.
Moreover, using the UPA, courts would be able to
appropriately apply a parental analytic framework in
lesbian coparent disputes, akin to that employed in
heterosexual paternity disputes and heterosexual divorces.56
Adjudication under the UPA is advantageous for lesbian
coparents because establishing maternity under the UPA
can be done more quickly and cheaply than with second-
parent adoption.57 Furthermore, a complaint under the UPA
need not initiate an adversarial proceeding; for instance,
parties can file a written voluntary acknowledgment of
parentage with the court, in lieu of filing a complaint, which
would have the same force and effect as an adjudication of
maternity." Filing of a maternity petition, before or after
the child's birth, can immediately legalize the relationship
between the child and her lesbian coparent and provide
absolute protection of the relationship in the event of the
54. While paternity statutes may be implemented in adversarial situations,
the UPA clearly anticipates voluntary paternity adjudications in some cases.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4, 6 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 298-99, 302-03 (2001).
55. See discussion infra Part III.A. Paternity adjudication does not merely
legitimize the child, it legitimizes the father of the child, by recognizing his
legal entitlement to a parental relationship. See Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491
U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989). Similarly, maternity adjudication would provide
necessary legal recognition and protection for millions of lesbian families.
56. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 15 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 324-25 (2001); UNIF.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 407 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 398 (1998).
57. Emily Doskow, The Second-Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex
Couples in a Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 21 (1999).
An adoption [in California] takes six to eight months to complete, and
cannot be commenced until after the child's birth. The DSS
[Department of Social Services] charges a fee of $1,250 for its
investigation. In contrast, the UPA petition can be filed prior to the
child's birth if desired, and because there is no DSS investigation, there
is no $1,250 fee.
Id. at 21 n.118 (citation omitted).
58. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 11(a) (West 1998). In
addition to the acknowledgment of parentage, the parties can also file a
parenting agreement, which reflects their intentions concerning support,
custody, visitation, and the like. Id. For purposes of establishing maternity, a
coparenting agreement further exemplifies to the court the parties' joint
intention to create a "two mommies" family.
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dissolution of the lesbian relationship or the biological
mother's death. Thus, the UPA offers the most reliable
method for legalizing a full parental relationship for lesbian
coparents with their children.
II. How COURTS APPLY THIRD PARTY EQUITABLE DOCTRINE
TO LESBIAN COPARENT DISPUTES: THREE CASE STUDIES
When lesbian couples who have children dissolve their
romantic relationships, they do not have the luxury of
turning to a marital dissolution statute for guidance
concerning the continued care, maintenance, and education
of their children. 9 Lesbian coparents, without any biological
tie to a child with whom they have developed a parental
relationship, are often without legal recourse to preserve
their parenthood." In the last decade, however, several
state courts have permitted lesbian coparents ongoing
visitation with their nonbiological children.6' Balancing the
importance of a biological parent's constitutional rights in
raising her child against the "right" of a lesbian coparent to
maintain an ongoing parental relationship with a child,
several courts have sought to define parameters under
which a parent-like relationship can be established without
infringing on the biological parent's rights.62
These cases have relied upon general third party
equitable principles to provide standing for the petitioning
lesbian coparent.6 Unfortunately, although these courts
59. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A.
573 (1998) (setting forth guidelines for calculating child support in a proceeding
for dissolution of marriage).
60. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995); E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548
(N.J. 2000).
62. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 436 (invocation of general equitable principles
to preserve the rights of a lesbian coparent must be exercised in a manner that
protects a biological parent's autonomy and constitutional rights); E.N.O., 711
N.E.2d at 893 (finding that the rights of parents to the care and custody of their
children is not absolute and that the biological mother's interest in protecting
her custody of her child must be balanced against the child's interest in
maintaining the relationship with her de facto parent); V.C., 748 A.2d at 548-9
(finding that the rights of parents to the care and custody of their children is
not absolute, thereby opening the door to the psychological parent doctrine).
63. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421 (finding that existing visitation statutes
did not preempt the "courts' long recognized equitable power to protect the best
interest of a child by ordering visitation under circumstances not included in
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recognized the importance to the children of an ongoing
parent-child relationship, the courts' decisions still did not
sufficiently resolve the conflicts, because no adjudication of
legal parentage was conferred upon the petitioner lesbian
coparents. Without recognizing legal parenthood, courts
only "fix" a part of the problem (visitation) and ignore the
many other emotional and financial benefits of legal
parenthood that children of lesbian coparents are denied.
While courts recognizing the rights of lesbian coparents
have made tremendous strides in preserving the interests
of the nontraditional family, these courts have not done
enough to fully protect the interests of the children and
their nonbiological parents. Equitable principles alone are
not sufficient to adequately address the lesbian coparent
dilemma.
The highest courts in three states that, in seminal
lesbian coparent dispute cases, have permitted ongoing
access by a lesbian coparent to her nonbiological child, have
employed various third party equitable doctrines in
rendering their decisions. Whether the court deemed the
lesbian coparent to be in a parent-like relationship, a
psychological parent, or a de facto parent, these quasi-
parental designations allowed the petitioners to participate
in a best interests custody/visitation analysis. Notwith-
standing the positive effect of applying these quasi-parental
doctrines to the petitioners, the result of these decisions is
that the lesbian coparent clearly occupies a much inferior
status to that of the biological parent, because quasi-
parental doctrines do not confer a status comparable to
legal parenthood. 4 Despite facts in all three cases that
clearly suggest a two parent family (comprised of "two
mommies")-which would otherwise dictate that the courts
should analyze the cases using a parental analytic
framework, as in paternity or divorce--the courts relied on
the statute"); E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 890 ("The court's duty as parens patriae
necessitates that its equitable powers extend to protecting the best interests of
children in actions before the court, even if the Legislature has not determined
what the best interests require in a particular situation."); V.C., 748 A.2d at 548
(invoking the court's equitable power to broadly interpret New Jersey's
definition of "parent" to include a person who is not related to the child by blood
or adoption but has stood in a parental role with the child, thereby permitting a
best interests analysis).
64. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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an expansion of third party doctrine to preserve the lesbian
coparent's relationship with her child(ren).
A. Parent-like Relationship
In Holtzman v. Knott, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that a lesbian coparent should be permitted to
maintain an ongoing relationship with the biological child
of her same-sex partner if certain criteria are met.65
Holtzman and Knott were in a long-term committed
relationship when they decided to have a child.6" The couple
agreed that Knott would conceive by artificial insemination,
and their child was born on December 15, 1988.7 Within
their circle of family and friends, both women were clearly
considered the baby's parents: the baby's name was
fashioned using first and middle names from each of their
families and the surname was a combination of both of their
last names; both women were named the child's parents at
their child's dedication ceremony at their church; and
Holtzman's parents were recognized by the couple as the
baby's grandparents and her sister as the baby's
godmother.68 For the next five years, the couple shared
child-care responsibilities, while Holtzman provided
primary financial support for the family.69 The relationship
soured in 1993, with Knott ultimately bringing an action to
prevent Holtzman from having any contact with her or with
their child.7" Holtzman then filed a petition for custody and
a petition for visitation.7' The circuit court denied
Holtzman's petitions, finding that Wisconsin law did not
recognize "the alternate type of relationship which existed
in this case" and further, that there was no basis for relief.72
65. 533 N.W.2d at 421 (articulating a four-prong test to demonstrate the
existence of a parent-child relationship as a means of establishing standing and
triggering a best interests analysis for ongoing visitation); see infra text
accompanying note 78. Holtzman is often cited as In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 422.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 423. However, the court also stated:
There are an increasing number of children in this society for whom
the mother is the only known biological parent. Frequently that mother
forms a lengthy relationship living with another person, be they man
356 [Vol. 50
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On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's determination that Holtzman did not have a
viable custody claim,73 but ruled that she could proceed with
her claim for visitation. Holtzman asserted that Wisconsin's
visitation statute provided jurisdiction for her visitation
claim.74  The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed and
determined that the statute only applied to those visitation
claims by third parties arising in connection with a
divorce.75 However, the court concluded that the legislature
did not intend the statute to "occupy the field of visitation,"
nor "intend [its] visitation statute to supplant or preempt
the courts' long-standing equitable power to protect the best
interest of a child by ordering visitation in circumstances
not included in the statute. 7 Rather, the court concluded
or woman, who assumes a parental role in the child's life for many
years. Why should such children be denied the love, guidance and
nurturing of the parental bond which developed simply because adults
cannot maintain their relationship? Lack of love and guidance in the
lives of children is a major problem in our society. Does it make sense
for the law to worsen this sad fact by denying a child contact with one
they have come to accept as their parent, especially when it clearly
appears to be in the best interest of the child?
Id.
73. Holtzman's custody claim failed for the reasons discussed above; because
of the constitutional principles of parental autonomy and privacy, a third party
is unable to prevail on a claim for custody in the absence of parental unfitness.
Id. at 436; see also supra text accompanying notes 36-41. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that "[a] person who is not a biological or adoptive parent
may not bring an action to obtain custody of a minor unless the biological or
adoptive parent is 'unfit or unable to care for the child' or there are compelling
reasons for awarding custody to a nonparent." Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 423
(citations omitted).
74. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 424. Wisconsin's visitation statute provides:
[Ulpon petition by a grandparent, great grandparent, stepparent or
person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child
relationship with the child, the court may grant reasonable visitation
rights to that person if the parents have notice of the hearing and if the
court determines that visitation is in the best interests of the child.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
75. The court engaged in an extensive review of the statute's legislative
history and concluded that "the legislature appears to have intended that
visitation petitions brought under sec. 767.245 be considered within the context
of a dissolving marriage." Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 426.
76. Id. at 425. Reviewing Wisconsin's visitation statutes, the court noted:
[Tihe legislature has clearly and repeatedly expressed the policy that
courts are to act in the best interest of children. It is reasonable to infer
that the legislature did not intend the visitation statutes to bar the
courts from exercising their equitable power to order visitation in
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that a trial court has equitable power to hear a petition for
visitation when it determines that the petitioner has a
parent-like relationship with the child and that a
significant triggering event justifies state intervention in
the child's relationship with her biological or adoptive
71parent.
7
The court articulated a four-prong test that a petitioner
must satisfy to prove a parent-child relationship:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-
like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the
child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant
responsibility for the child's care, education, and development,
including contributing towards the child's support, without
expectation of financial compensation [though such contribution
need not be monetary]; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a
parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established
with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in
nature.8
The court determined that such a test balances the
biological or adoptive parent's autonomy and constitutional
rights while preserving the child's relationship with an
adult who has functioned as a parent.79 The four-pronged
parent-like relationship test is useful to permit continued
visitation, but the test does not establish "legal
parenthood." Rather, the test establishes a quasi-
parenthood that is considered only with respect to visitation
issues and does not establish parental parity between the
lesbian coparent and her former partner."
circumstances not included within the statutes but in conformity with
the policy directions set forth in the statutes.
Id. at 431.
77. Id. at 435.
78. Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 436.
80. The focus and purpose of the court's discussion of the four-part "parent-
like relationship test" was to determine on what basis Holtzman could assert a
claim for visitation, not custody. Id. at 437 ("A circuit court may determine
whether visitation with Holtzman is in the child's best interest if Holtzman first
proves under the four part test that she has a parent-like relationship with the
child .... ).
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B. Psychological Parent
Although under the guise of a different name, the
psychological parent doctrine is nearly identical to the
parent-like relationship doctrine.8 In V.C. v. M.J.B., the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that a nonbiological
lesbian coparent had functioned as a psychological parent
to her former partner's biological children and awarded her
visitation rights.82 V.C. and M.J.B. began dating on July 4,
1993 and five days later M.J.B. visited a fertility specialist
to begin artificial insemination procedures.83 Early in their
relationship, the women discussed having children, and as
M.J.B. continued the artificial insemination process, V.C.
attended at least two sessions.84  The relationship
progressed: V.C. moved in with M.J.B. in December 1993
and, in February 1994, when M.J.B. learned that she was
pregnant, she called V.C. at work "to tell her the good
news."" Eventually the couple learned that M.J.B. was
carrying twins and the two women prepared for the birth of
the twins by attending pre-natal and Lamaze classes.86
The facts suggested that the women jointly planned to
parent: both attended pre-natal and Lamaze classes; they
jointly decided on the children's names; they decided that
V.C. would be called "Meema" and M.J.B. would be called
"Mommy"; V.C. was present in the delivery room for the
birth of the twins; the couple opened joint bank accounts for
household expenses; they prepared wills and powers of
attorney, naming each other as beneficiary on their
respective life insurance policies, and opened savings
accounts for the children with M.J.B. as custodian of one
account and V.C. as custodian of the other; and, most
significantly, the couple held themselves out both privately
and publicly as a family.87 In February 1995, the couple
purchased a home together, and in July 1995 they had a
commitment ceremony, thereafter considering themselves
"married."8
81. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
82. Id. at 555.
83. Id. at 542.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 542-43.
88. Id. at 543.
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In June 1996, the couple consulted with an attorney
concerning V.C.'s adopting the twins, but the adoption was
never finalized.89 In August 1996, M.J.B. ended the
relationship and the women then took turns living in the
house with the children until November 1996.90 In
December 1996, V.C. moved out but continued contributing
to household expenses and she visited with the children
approximately every other weekend.9' By the summer of
1997, however, the couple's relationship had truly
deteriorated and M.J.B. no longer permitted V.C. to visit
with the children or accepted V.C.'s financial
contributions.92 V.C. subsequently filed a petition for joint
legal custody of the twins.93 The trial court determined that
V.C. did not have standing to petition for joint legal custody
because she did not allege that M.J.B. was an unfit parent;
V.C. appealed.94
On appeal, M.J.B. asserted that V.C. had no standing to
bring her claims because she did not allege that M.J.B. was
an unfit parent and, further, that V.C.'s petition was an
intrusion on her basic liberty interest and parental
autonomy in raising her children.95 V.C. contended that she
qualified as a parent under New Jersey statutory law and
that she was a psychological parent, justifying the
invocation of the state's parens patriae power.
96
V.C. sought ongoing contact with her children under a
state statute which allows the court to enter visitation and
custody orders upon the separation of a child's parents. 97
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the
definition of "parent" within the family law statutory
scheme encompasses more than a biological or adoptive
parent.98 The court noted that the visitation statute
89. Id. at 544.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 545.
95. Id. at 546.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 547. The statute provides that "[wihen the parents of a minor
child live separately, or are about to do so, the Superior Court, in an action
brought by either parent, shall have the same power to make judgments or
orders concerning care, custody, education and maintenance as concerning a
minor child whose parents are divorced." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-3 (West 1993).
98. 748 A.2d at 547.
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provides that "the word 'parent,' when not otherwise
described by the context means a natural parent or parent
by previous adoption."' 9 Thus, the court determined, the
legislature must have envisioned circumstances in which a
relationship between a child and a person not specifically
denominated by the statute as a parent would, in fact,
qualify as "parental.""' The court concluded that it could
exercise jurisdiction over V.C.'s complaint since a broad
reading of the statute includes parents other than biological
or adoptive parents.1 1
The court did not end its inquiry there, however.
Instead, it turned its analysis to whether V.C. had standing
apart from the statute to bring her complaint since she did
not allege that M.J.B. was an unfit parent. 102 The court
reverted to a traditional inquiry and application of third
party visitation doctrine determining whether a non-parent
can seek visitation with a child in the absence of the legal
parent's unfitness. In determining that third party
visitation doctrine could be applied in this case, the court
effectively distanced itself from the parental analytic
framework it had considered.
Holding that under general equitable third party
visitation doctrine V.C. could maintain her visitation
request, the court concluded that, while an allegation of
unfitness or abandonment is generally the prerequisite for
a third party to seek custody and visitation of another
person's child, there is an "exceptional circumstances"
category that provides an alternative basis for proceeding
with a custody and/or visitation complaint.' Subsumed
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 548. The court did not engage in a long elaboration of its
statutory interpretation, but noted that:
Although the Legislature may not have considered the precise case
before us, it is hard to imagine what it could have had in mind in
adding the "context" language other than a situation such as this, in
which a person not related to a child by blood or adoption has stood in a
parental role vis-a-vis the child.
Id.
101. Id. The court did not elaborate and discuss whether V.C. had exercised
a "parental" relationship with the twins; the court engaged in that analysis as
part of its discussion of standing and psychological parenthood. Id. at 548-50.
102. Id. at 548.
103. Id. at 549. "[Exceptional circumstances] has been recognized as an
alternative basis for a third party to seek custody and visitation of another
person's child. The 'exceptional circumstances' category contemplates the
intervention of the Court in the exercise of its parens patriae power to protect a
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within the exceptional circumstances category, the court
noted, are the psychological parent cases in which a third
party has assumed the role of a legal parent "who has been
unable or unwilling to undertake the obligation of
parenthood."" 4 At the heart of the doctrine is "a recognition
that children have a strong interest in maintaining the ties
that connect them to adults who love and provide for
them.""' Even though V.C. did not step into M.J.B.'s role as
a parent, but instead worked alongside her in establishing a
family, the court held that V.C. had standing to maintain
her action under the exceptional circumstances/psych-
ological parent doctrine.0 ' To determine whether a
petitioner has established herself as a psychological parent,
the court adopted the four-prong test outlined in Holtzman
v. Knott.1"7 Under the psychological parent test, the court
concluded that V.C. should have continued visitation with
the children on a regular basis. However, due to the long
pendency of the case, the court concluded it would be
unnecessarily disruptive to then inject V.C. into the
"decisional realm" and denied her an award of joint legal
custody.0 8
Using psychological parenthood, the court accomplished
the important goal of assuring ongoing parental contact
between V.C. and her children, but did not recognize her as
a parent in any other way. Third party visitation doctrine
effectively distanced V.C. from the parental analytic
framework, despite the court's earlier determination that
V.C. qualified as a parent under New Jersey's visitation
statute.0 9 Furthermore, third party visitation doctrine, by
its very nature, does not provide the lesbian coparent with
child." Id. (citations omitted). The court determined that the exceptional
circumstances category includes psychological parents. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 550.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 551. ("The most thoughtful and inclusive definition of de facto
parenthood is the test enunciated in [Holtzman v. Knott] and adopted ... here.
It addresses the main fears and concerns both legislatures and courts have
advanced when addressing the notion of psychological parenthood.").
108. Id. at 555.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. Even if the court had found
that V.C. was a "parent" under the New Jersey visitation statute, the court did
not entertain the possibility of a parentage adjudication, nor would such
adjudication be possible pursuant to a visitation statute alone.
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rights equivalent to those of a legal parent.11 ° Although
psychological parenthood allowed V.C. continued access to
her children, the result in the case shows that her rights
are clearly inferior to those of her former partner. As the
court stated:
The legal parent's status is a significant weight in the best
interests balance because eventually, in the search for self-
knowledge, the child's interest in his or her roots will emerge.
Thus, under ordinary circumstances when the evidence concerning
the child's best interests (as between a legal parent and
psychological parent) is in equipoise, custody will be awarded to
the legal parent.'
1
C. De Facto Parent
Using a slightly different test, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in E.N.O. v. L.M.M., invoked
general equitable principles to award a lesbian coparent
petitioner visitation with the biological child of her same-
sex partner.12 In 1991, the two women-who at the time
lived in Maryland-shared a committed, monogamous
relationship, and decided to have a baby by artificial
insemination."' The couple attended parenting workshops
and sessions on artificial insemination; E.N.O. was present
at the actual insemination sessions, and both women
participated in all medical decisions."' In 1994, the
insemination process was successful and L.M.M. became
pregnant. E.N.O., present at the birth and acting as birth
coach, cut the umbilical cord, and was treated by hospital
staff "as a mother.""' The couple sent out birth
110. As Professor Ruthann Robson notes in a her criticism of V.C. v. M.J.B.,
the court creates an inequality relating to proof of parenthood, which also
persists in the way the standard is implemented. Moreover, the legal parent
enjoys preferential treatment by virtue of her biological connection to the child.
Thus, the "parity" of which the court writes is illusory because the rights of the
lesbian coparent are subordinate to those of the legal parent. Ruthann Robson,
Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & The Judicial Construction of Lesbian
Mothers, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15, 33-34 (2000).
111. 748 A.2d at 554.
112. 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999).
113. Id. at 888.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 889.
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announcements naming them both as the child's parents.'16
Before the child was born and again after the child's birth,
the parties executed a coparenting agreement in which they
expressly stated that they intended to coparent the child
and that E.N.O. would retain her parental status, even if
the couple were to separate."7 Following the child's birth,
E.N.O. assumed most of the financial responsibility for the
family and, for a period of seven months, she assumed
primary care for the child when L.L.M. was experiencing
medical problems."8
In September 1997, the couple moved to Massachusetts;
and in the spring of 1998, E.N.O. consulted an attorney
regarding a second-parent adoption.'19 Shortly thereafter,
the parties' relationship began to deteriorate.' In June
1998, E.N.O. filed a complaint seeking specific performance
of the parties' agreement to allow her to adopt the child,
and for joint custody and visitation, as well as a settlement
of the parties' financial affairs. 2' A probate court judge
ordered temporary visitation, applying the "best interests of
the child" standard and noting that, pursuant to
Massachusetts's paternity statute, " 'children born to
parents who are not married to each other should be
treated in the same manner as all other children.' ,,122
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court disagreed
that statutes governing paternity were applicable to this
case. ' However, the court determined that the probate
116. Id.
117. Id. Massachusetts might enforce such a coparenting agreement if its
terms reflect the best interests of the child. The E.N.O. court noted that a
cohabiting couple can contract concerning the rights of their children as long as
the court determines that the terms reflect the child's best interests. Id. at 892
(citing Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 148 n.7 (Mass. 1998)); see also A.C. v.
C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M. 1992) (an agreement between a biological mother
and lesbian coparent concerning coparenting issues upon the dissolution of the
relationship was deemed enforceable by the New Mexico appeals court, so long
as the terms represented the best interests of the child).
118. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889.
119. Id. Second-parent adoption was not available in Maryland.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. (quoting the trial court). The court cited to a Massachussetts child
support statute which provides that "[c]hildren born to parents who are not
married to each other shall be entitled to the same rights and protections of the
law as all other children." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 1 (West 1998).
123. 711 N.E.2d at 890 n.3. Interestingly, Massachusetts's parentage
statute specifically includes a maternity provision modeled after that included
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court's equitable powers extend to protecting the best
interests of children, even if the legislature has not
articulated what "best interests" require in a particular
situation. 12 4 Finding that the best interest standard is
amorphous, the court stated that "the 'best interests
calculus' must include an examination of the child's
relationship with both [her] legal and de facto parent." 5
Reviewing the facts in the case before it, the court
concluded that E.N.O. met the definition of a de facto
parent and was properly awarded visitation.2 ' The court
defined a de facto parent as a person who:
has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the
child's life as a member of the child's family. The de facto parent
resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of
the legal parent, performs a share of care taking functions at least
as great as the legal parent. The de facto parent shapes the child's
daily routine, addresses his developmental needs, disciplines the
child, provides for his education and medical care, and serves as a
moral guide. 2 7
in the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act. The statute provides, in part, that "[any
interested party may bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and
child relationship." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 21. Furthermore, as the
trial judge determined, the purpose of the Massachusetts parentage statute is
to ensure that children born out of wedlock are treated in the same manner as
children born to married parents. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889; see supra note 122
and accompanying text. The E.N.O. court relegated its dismissal of the
applicability of the paternity statute to a footnote, although it certainly would
make sense under the Massachusetts parentage statute to allow E.N.O.
standing to pursue her claim under that provision. The de facto parent analysis
should be the second step in determining the visitation and parental rights of
the lesbian coparent, after first exercising jurisdiction over the dispute under
the parentage statute. See discussion infra Part III.
124. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 890. The court cited a Massachussetts statute
that provides: "The probate and family court department shall have original
and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial court and the superior
court department of all cases and matters of equity cognizable under the
general principles of equity jurisprudence and, with reference thereto, shall be
courts of general equity jurisdiction ... ." MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 6
(West 1989).
125. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891.
126. Id. at 892. The court emphasized that the biological parent endorsed
and consented to the lesbian coparent's full parental role in raising their child,
as evidenced both through the parties' actions and their written coparenting
agreement. Id.
127. Id. at 891 (citing Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999) and
ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §§ 2.03(1)(b), (6) (Tent.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded
that E.N.O.'s visitation request, based upon her status as a
de facto parent, did not inappropriately infringe on the
rights of L.M.M. because the child's interest in maintaining
a relationship with E.N.O. outweighed L.M.M.'s custodial
interest.'28
As this was an appeal from a temporary order
concerning visitation, the court did not address other
"parental" concerns, such as child support, health
insurance, life insurance, and most importantly, an
adjudication of parentage. However, since the court
specifically concluded that Massachusetts's parentage
statute did not apply, the court foreclosed the possibility of
a maternity adjudication and with it, foreclosed the child's
ability to benefit from two legal parents. Furthermore,
while the court emphasized that E.N.O.'s visitation claim
did not infringe on L.M.M.'s custodial interest, the court
might have viewed a custodial award to E.N.O. differently if
it had followed the reasoning of V.C. v.M.J.B. and
determined that a de facto parent's rights are subordinate
to those of a biological parent.129
D. Why Equitable Doctrines Are Only a Partial Solution
By approaching the lesbian coparent cases from a
parent-like, psychological parent, de facto parent, or similar
perspective, courts have made considerable progress, and
have improved the chances for a lesbian coparent to
maintain a relationship with her child(ren). But they have
fallen short of the mark. The equitable remedies discussed
above only encompass the issues of custody and visitation.'
None of these equitable doctrines has been used to
adjudicate the lesbian coparent's maternity or to establish
Draft No. 3 Part I 1998)). While the ALI Principles provide guidance for courts
engaged in a best interests analysis of custody and visitation, the category of de
facto parent, in itself, does not provide jurisdiction of a lesbian coparent dispute
nor does it permit a maternity adjudication. The biological parent remains in a
superior position, even if she did not have the primary caretaking
responsibilities.
128. 711 N.E. 2d at 893.
129. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
130. As discussed above, these equitable remedies do not equalize the
biological parent and lesbian coparent. See supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
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legal parity between the lesbian coparent and her former
partner.
For example, in Holtzman v. Knott, despite facts
indicating that Holtzman functioned as every bit the child's
mother as her former partner, she was stripped of her
functional parental status and relegated to third party
status by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The parent-like
relationship test did not establish legal parity between
Holtzman and Knott; it merely allowed Holtzman access to
a child whom she helped to raise. Similarly, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in V.C. v. M.J.B. limited the utility of the
psychological parent doctrine. Unlike a situation in which
both caretakers have legal parental recognition and may be
awarded joint or shared custody, under the psychological
parent doctrine lesbian coparents are merely earning the
right to visit with the children that they have helped to
raise, but are not likely to be awarded the right to continue
raising those children. And, similarly, children who were
raised for several years by two parents are being denied the
right to continue having their lesbian coparent function in
that capacity.
These equitable doctrine decisions are Pyrrhic victories
for lesbian coparents; under the parent-like relationship,
psychological parent, and de facto parent doctrines, lesbian
coparents still occupy an inferior legal status as compared
to their former partners."1 Third party visitation doctrine
would be better exercised, and provide better security for
children and their lesbian coparents, if it were used within
the context of the UPA to establish legal parenthood and
not merely a "parent-like status." In order to confer upon
lesbian coparents a full range of legal rights, courts must
look beyond third party visitation doctrine and move to a
parental analytic framework. 3 By so doing, courts will
equalize the rights of the biological and nonbiological
lesbian mothers. Furthermore, courts will thereby protect
the children as well, ensuring that children of lesbian
parents benefit from two legal parents.
Third party visitation doctrine also inadequately
resolves the issue of standing, the legal basis upon which a
lesbian coparent may bring her custody and visitation
131. See Robson, supra note 37, at 1402; see also supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
132. Robson, supra note 37, at 1398.
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claim. Because courts have not often recognized a statutory
basis upon which lesbian coparents can maintain their
claims, they have relied on the equitable principles
discussed above both as a mechanism for determining
whether the petitioner has standing to bring her claim and
to decide the merits of the claim. By conflating the issues of
standing and merits, courts do little to clarify the legal
process for future petitioners. As noted concerning E.N.O. v.
L.L.M., "by defining the de facto parent standard as an
aspect of the substantive best interests analysis, rather
than as a procedural standing requirement, the E.N.O.
court neither explicitly extended nor limited the possible
extension of parental standing rights to lesbian
coparents."'33 The court did not differentiate its standing
analysis from its analysis of the merits, leaving unclear the
specific circumstances under which a lesbian coparent may
petition for custody and visitation with her child. The
Massachussetts Supreme Judicial Court left to the state's
probate courts the task of determining whether a petitioner
is a de facto parent before determining whether the
petitioner has the right to bring a visitation or custody
claim.
Similarly, the Holtzman court subsumed its four-
pronged parent-like relationship test within a best interest
analysis, and never specifically identified upon what legal
basis a lesbian coparent has standing to file an action for
ongoing visitation or custody with her child.' In framing
the issue before the court as "whether the circuit court
should exercise its equitable powers to consider Holtzman's
claim that visitation is in the child's best interest,"'35 the
Holtzman court proceeded with a best interests/merits
analysis on the presumption that Holtzman had standing to
pursue her claim under equity principles; but the court did
not clearly articulate a standing rule applicable to future
petitioners. Rather, the court applied a circular analysis by
fusing the best interests analysis and the procedural
standing requirement: before the court will hear the
petition, the petitioner must establish the parent-like
133. Family Law-Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Upholds Probate
Court's Exercise of Equity Power in Granting Visitation Between a Child and a
Lesbian De Facto Parent, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1551, 1555 (2000).
134. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995).
135. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
368 [Vol. 50
ADJUDICATING MATERNITY
relationship-the same test that affects her rights to
visitation with her child.
Unlike the E.N.O. and Holtzman courts, the V.C. court
noted that it had jurisdiction to hear V.C.'s complaint under
a New Jersey visitation statute, but did not base
jurisdiction on the statute alone, since V.C. had made no
allegation of M.J.B.'s unfitness. Instead, the court also used
the equitable psychological parenthood doctrine to establish
V.C.'s standing to maintain her custody and visitation
claim. Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court, too, has
inextricably linked the standing and best interests of the
child analyses, as the psychological parent test is used both
as a basis for exercising jurisdiction of the complaint and
for determining whether the petitioner is entitled to
ongoing visitation by virtue of how "parental" her role was
during the course of the couple's relationship.
The decisions in Holtzman, V.C., and E.N.O. imply that
if the petitioner can overcome the substantive hurdles of a
best interests analysis, she will also satisfy the standing
requirement. These courts, however, in thus combining the
standing and best interests analyses, leave ambiguous their
position on standing because they have neither clearly
articulated a standard nor provided sufficient guidance for
future litigants. Additionally, these courts leave ambiguous
what likelihood, if any, a lesbian coparent has to maintain a
relationship with her child. A uniform and consistent
approach by courts to lesbian coparent disputes, such as
using the UPA, would clarify standing issues and assist
lesbian coparents in maintaining a parental relationship
with their children.
III. APPLYING THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT TO LESBIAN
COPARENTS
The parental analytic framework regularly applies in
divorce and paternity cases. While predicated on a one
mother/one father model, the parental framework can and
should be applied to nontraditional families, regardless of
the sex of the parents. Just as second-parent adoption has
been used to establish two legal parents of the same sex, so,
too, can the UPA be applied. The purpose of the UPA is to
provide substantive legal equality for all children by
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protecting the rights of children born out of wedlock.'36 The
1973 Act codified the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
and lower courts throughout the country at the time-a
recognition that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution mandates equal treatment for children born in
or out of wedlock.'37 Why then, shouldn't an Act designed to
protect children born of unmarried heterosexual parents be
applied to children of lesbian couples, specifically to
adjudicate the maternity of nonbiological, nonadoptive
lesbian coparents?
A. Who Is a Parent Under the Uniform Parentage Act?
The Uniform Parentage Act has always contemplated
that "parent" can mean more than a biological or adoptive
parent. Section 1 of the UPA defines the "parent and child
relationship" as the "legal relationship existing between a
child and his natural or adoptive parents."'38 The statute's
use of "natural," rather than "biological," is significant.
Section 3 of the Act makes this distinction clear:
[TIhe parent and child relationship between a child and (1) the
natural mother may be established by proof of her having given
birth to the child, or under this Act ; (2) the natural father may be
established under this Act; (3) an adoptive parent may be
established by proof of adoption.1
9
By distinguishing relationships founded on biology,
adoption, or "under this Act," the Act broadens the scope of
whose parental status can reasonably be adjudicated.
Specifically, the UPA's language indicates that a non-
biological or nonadoptive parent can indeed be considered a
"natural" parent under the statute. °
136. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 289 (2001).
137. Id. at 378-79.
138. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 387 (2001).
139. Id. § 3, 9B U.L.A. at 391-92 (emphasis added).
140. UPA 2000 continues to recognize that a legal parent may not be a
biological or adoptive parent. Section 102(14) defines "parent" as "an individual
who has established a parent-child relationship under Section 201." The
omission of "biological" or "adoptive" parent within the definition of "parent"
remains significant: "The mother-child relationship is established between a
woman and a child by: (1) the woman's having given birth to the child... ; (2)
an adjudication of the woman's maternity; [or] (3) adoption of the child by the
woman." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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For example, the Act long recognized that a certain
category of nonbiological and nonadoptive parents should
nonetheless be adjudicated as legal parents under the Act:
presumptive fathers. Under section 4 of UPA 1973, a man
may be presumed to be a child's father in a number of
circumstances.' Two of these presumptions are illustrative
By continuing to identify three possible bases of establishing parenthood-
biology, adoption, and adjudication-the Act broadens the scope of whose
parental status can reasonably be established, and further indicates that a
lesbian coparent who can prove her de facto or psychological parent status can
indeed be established a legal parent under the statute.
141. The text of section 4 of UPA 1973 reads:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each
other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days
after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a
court;
(2) before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent
compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid, and,
(i) if the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court,
the child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days
after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce; or
(ii) if the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the
child is born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation;
(3) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized
in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is
or could be declared invalid, and
(i) he has acknowledged his paternity in writing filed with the
[appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau].
(ii) with his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's
birth certificate, or
(iii) he is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary
promise or by court order;
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child; or
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with
the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which shall promptly
inform the mother of the filing of his acknowledgment, and she does
not dispute the acknowledgment within a reasonable time after being
informed thereof, in a writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital
Statistics Bureau]. If another man is presumed under this section to be
the child's father, acknowledgment may be effected only with the
written consent of the presumed father or after the presumption has
been rebutted.
(b) A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropri-
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of the adjudication of nonbiological fathers as "legal"
fathers: those founded on marriage and holding oneself out
as a father. These paternity presumptions have been
extensively litigated and courts have consistently
demonstrated their desire to preserve intact father and
child relationships.' One of the strongest legal presump-
tions is that a child born to a married woman is legitimate:
the woman's husband is presumed the legal father.' The
marital presumption-that the husband was the child's
father in the absence of proof of impotence, sterility, or non-
access to the wife-was a fundamental principle of English
common law and protected the legitimacy of children, which
entitled them to financial support, afforded them
inheritance rights, and preserved the stability of the
ate action only by clear and convincing evidence. If two or more
presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the presumption
which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy
and logic controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court decree
establishing paternity of the child by another man.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 393-94 (2001).
142. The Act (UPA 2000) no longer includes a presumption of "natural"
fatherhood arising from receiving a child into one's home and holding the child
out as one's natural child, codified in UPA 1973 at section 4(a)(4). The drafters
of UPA 2000 have determined that in this age of improved genetic marker
testing, biological determiners are preferential to merely holding oneself out as
a father as a more efficient means of adjudicating paternity. However, as
discussed below, it is questionable whether courts will so easily move to a
biological preference, because for several decades, courts have established a
body of case law that relies on this presumption to preserve an existing,
functional parent child relationship. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying
text.
Furthermore, while the drafters of UPA 2000 place greater reliance on
biology and less reliance on "holding oneself out" as a parent, this is in direct
contrast to the position of the American Law Institute, which has promulgated
Principles governing the allocation of custodial and decision-making
responsibility for children, and which defines "parent" as a legal parent, parent
by estoppel, or a de facto parent. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1) (Tent. Draft No. 4 2000). A parent by estoppel is defined,
in part, as someone who holds herself out and accepts full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent. Id. § 2.03(1)(b). A de facto parent is defined, in part,
as someone who regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as
great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived. Id. § 2.03(1)(c).
This emphasis on functional parenthood within the ALI Principles further
serves to reinforce the necessity of looking beyond biology in parentage
disputes.
143. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 4.4 (2d ed. West 1988). For a thorough discussion of the evolution of
the marital presumption in paternity see generally Glennon, supra note 8.
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family.' The preservation of family integrity through the
marital presumption was upheld in the Supreme Court's
well-publicized decision of Michael H. v. Gerald D. '45
In Michael H., a biological father sought to establish his
paternity over the objections of the biological mother and
her husband, to whom she was married at the time of
conception.'46 In upholding California's conclusive marital
presumption of paternity, the Court held that allowing
Michael H.'s claim would undermine family integrity, in
contrast to a situation where a husband or wife may raise
the issue of illegitimacy.4 7 The Court noted that Michael H.
did not merely seek to have himself declared the child's
father, but to "obtain parental prerogatives."'48 However,
the Court concluded that where the child "is born into an
extant marital family, the natural father's unique
opportunity [to develop a relationship with his child]
conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the
husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for
the State to give categorical preference to the latter."'49
The critical underpinning of the marital presumption is
the importance of preserving an intact family unit and
existing parent-child relationships. The doctrine of
equitable estoppel similarly fosters family stability and
integrity. Estoppel is sometimes used in conjunction with
the marital presumption, to prevent a married man from
illegitimizing the child he held out as his own.5 Estoppel
may also used by courts to prevent a man from attempting
144. Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 70 (2000).
145. 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1988).
146. Id. at 113-16.
147. Id. at 129 & n.7. In most jurisdictions today, the marital presumption
is largely rebuttable, placing the burden of proving the husband's non-paternity
on the moving party, often the wife or the biological, putative father. See CLARK,
supra note 143, at 191 & n.33.
148. 491 U.S. at 126.
149. Id. at 129.
150. E.g., Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998) (holding that former
husband could not seek to disestablish paternity six years after divorce
proceedings, despite his recent ascertainment of facts which led him to believe
he was not child's biological father, because "[w]here the presumptive father
has held himself out as the child's parent, and engaged in an ongoing parent-
child relationship for a period of years, he may not disavow that relationship
and destroy a child's long-held assumptions, solely for his own self-interest").
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to disestablish his paternity based on a lack of biological
connection to a child that he held out as his own. 5'
Despite advances in genetic testing, the notion of
functional parenthood is still an important factor in
paternity adjudications, as demonstrated in a recent Ohio
decision. In Crago v. Kinzie, 5' a man who had functioned
and held himself out as the father of two children for almost
a decade sought to disestablish his paternity after the
children's mother sought child support.5 ' The record
demonstrated that he and the mother had lived together as
"man and wife," although they were not married; that he
listed himself as the children's father on their respective
birth certificates; and that the children bore his surname."'
The court phrased the determinative issue as follows: "Did
the putative father take some action or refrain from taking
some action that he reasonably should have taken, which
gave rise to a conclusion, reasonably relied upon by the
children, the mother, or the public, which now precludes
him from attempting to establish the contrary of that
conclusion?"'55
The court concluded "yes": by holding himself out and
functioning as the children's father for nearly ten years, he
was prevented by the doctrine of estoppel from seeking
genetic marker testing which might disprove his pater-
nity. 6 The court stressed the importance of "finality" over
"perfection"'57 and noted the importance of the children's
reliance on his paternity for their financial and emotional
well-being, which militated against his interest in
disproving his paternity.'
151. E.g., In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 495-96 (Mass. 2001)
(holding that nonbiological father was barred from asserting non-paternity of
child he held out as his own and financially supported for more than five years
before challenging his paternity on grounds that genetic tests revealed he was
not child's biological father). The court stated that "[wihere a father and child
have a substantial parent-child relationship ... and the father has provided the
child with consistent emotional and financial support, an attempt to undo a
determination of paternity is 'potentially devastating to a child who ha[s]
considered the man to be the father.'" Id. at 495.
152. 733 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 2000).
153. Id. at 1223.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1228.
157. Id. at 1226.
158. Id. at 1233. The court noted that equity may preclude consideration of
genetic testing:
374 [Vol. 50
ADJUDICATING MATERNITY
The Michael H. and Crago courts determined that
undoing an existing parent-child relationship is potentially
devastating to a child who has lived with the knowledge
and reliance that a certain man is her father. Similarly,
excising a loving mother from a child's life because of her
lack of biological (hence, legal) connection to the child
carries the same potentially disastrous consequences, as
most poignantly expressed in Micah's story. The marital
presumption and estoppel have been successfully used to
maintain the father-child relationship in the absence of a
biological tie because courts know that children rely on
established parent-child relationships. Undoing that
relationship does more than remove a source of child
support from the child's life; it causes a lack of security and
stability in the child's life.
The principles on which these presumptions are
founded include stability for the child, maintaining an
existing parent and child relationship, and ensuring that
the child will continue to reap the benefits, particularly the
financial benefits, of having two legal parents. Applying
these principles to preserve familial relationships
demonstrates that functioning as parent-socially,
emotionally, financially-is more important than biological
or adoptive connection to the child. And applying these
principles has rendered a nonbiological or nonadoptive
(heterosexual) parent a legal parent under the UPA. These
principles are equally applicable to lesbian coparents. Thus,
the issue of UPA application to lesbian coparents becomes
not one of legal theory but social practice. Courts certainly
recognize the importance of preserving the integrity of an
existing father and child relationship. Courts have not been
so willing to preserve the integrity of a relationship
between a lesbian coparent and her child.'59
With the advent and widespread availability of genetic testing, it is
tempting for putative fathers to assume that their exclusion as the
biological father of a child through such testing will necessarily
extinguish their duty of parental support. Putative fathers who make
this erroneous assumption may learn that the ... rules of equity
render their disestablishment efforts for naught.
Id. at 1230.
159. E.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing
to apply equitable estoppel to find lesbian coparent a "parent" under statute
and declining to award her visitation with child); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279
Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that equitable estoppel could not be used
to establish lesbian coparent's legal parentage).
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The one mother/one father model pervades family law
doctrine and continues to serve as the biggest hurdle in
adjudicating maternity for lesbian coparents. For example,
in discussing the difficulties of obtaining legal recognition
for lesbian coparents, Professor Polikoff observed that
Michael H. reinforces the state's interest "in assuring that
every child has neither more nor less than one mother and
one father."6 ' Similarly, in analyzing the application of
third party doctrine to lesbian coparents, Professor
Ruthann Robson observed that "[tihe lesbian nonlegal
mother... challenges the heterosexual matrix of third
party custody by being the 'other' mother in an ideology
that acknowledges only one mother, the third party in an
ideology that admits of only two parents, one of each
gender."
161
But in keeping stride with social trends, our laws-and
application of our laws-must adapt to fit scenarios that
were not previously contemplated.'"2 As Professor Polikoff
wrote more than a decade ago:
When parents create a nontraditional family, that family becomes
the reality of the child's life. The child may experience some
stigma, but courts should delegitimize, not condone, disparaging
community attitudes. The courts should protect children's
interests within the context of nontraditional families, rather than
attempt to eradicate such families by adhering to a fictitious,
homogeneous family model.1
63
Approximately ten million children are being raised by
same-sex parents.' These children should be protected by
our courts, not punished. The concerns that prompted the
implementation of the UPA and its parental presump-
tions-the need to provide financial and emotional
protection for a child born to unmarried heterosexual
parents-are equally applicable to children born to
unmarried lesbian parents, and the same legal analysis
should apply.
160. Polikoff, supra note 7, at 479.
161. Robson, supra note 37, at 1391-92.
162. Courts have been able to relax the rigidity of the one mother/one father
model in permitting same-sex second parent adoptions; the same movement
away from the traditional model should apply to UPA maternity adjudication
for lesbian coparents.
163. Polikoff, supra note 7, at 482.
164. See Kellogg, supra note 2, at B10.
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Lesbian coparents should be able to obtain parentage
adjudications under the UPA just as nonbiological fathers
can and do. The text of the Act seems to lend itself to such
an application. The UPA includes a provision for a
declaration of maternity, which provides a statutory basis
upon which lesbian coparents can pursue their custody and
visitation claims: section 21 of the Act provides that "[any
interested party may bring an action to determine the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relation-
ship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this Act
applicable to the father and child relationship apply."'65
Read in conjunction with section 3, which permits the
establishment of a mother and child relationship "under
this Act" and not just on biology or adoption,'66 section 21
can be used to adjudicate a lesbian coparent's maternity. 167
Using the equitable doctrines of de facto or
psychological parenthood or equitable estoppel can assist
the court in making determinations of whether the
petitioner has truly acted as a parent, deserving of
parentage adjudication. However, by applying these equi-
table doctrines within the broader statutory framework,
courts will do more than make piecemeal resolutions of
visitation disputes: courts will preserve the integrity of
relationships between lesbian coparents and their children,
just as they have for heterosexual fathers.
B. The Lesbian Coparent Cases
The issue of whether the Act should apply to lesbian
coparents has been litigated for more than a decade. While
early cases held that the Act should not be applied to
nonbiological or nonadoptive mothers, recent cases have
properly begun to apply the Act to lesbian coparents and
other "nontraditional" parents. These recent cases illustrate
a better judicial understanding of our societal move from a
165. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 334 (2001).
166. Id. § 3, 9B U.L.A. at 391-92.
167. Similarly, section 106 of UPA 2000 states that "[p]rovisions of this [Act]
relating to determination of paternity apply to determinations of maternity."
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (2000). Read in conjunction with section 201, which
permits the establishment of a mother and child relationship by an adjudication
of the woman's maternity and not just by birth or adoption, and section 602,
which authorizes standing for a woman whose maternity is to be adjudicated,
UPA 2000 can be used to establish a lesbian coparent's maternity. Id. §§ 201,
602.
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one mother/one father model of family to other models,
including same-sex parent families.
1. The "Traditional" Paradigm. One of the first cases
to address whether the UPA can be used to adjudicate the
maternity of a lesbian coparent was Curiale v. Reagan. 8 In
Curiale, a lesbian couple who had been residing together in
a committed relationship, decided to have a baby through
artificial insemination and to both raise the child.169 While
the defendant Reagan gave birth to the child, Curiale
provided the sole financial support for the family. 7 ' The
couple's relationship ended three years after their child's
birth, at which time the couple executed a written
agreement which provided, inter alia, for the sharing of
physical custody of the child.7 1 Six months later, Reagan
informed Curiale that she was no longer willing to share
custody of the child and further, that Curiale could no
longer visit with the child. 72 Curiale subsequently filed a
complaint to "'establish de facto parent status/maternity
and for custody and visitation." 173 The trial court held that
it was without jurisdiction to hear Curiale's claim and that
there was no statutory basis for her claim of parental
status. 17
On appeal, Curiale asserted that one foundation for her
claim was California Civil Code section 7015, part of
California's version of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act.
7 1
The California Court of Appeals for the Third District held
that, while section 7015 confers standing upon any
interested person to bring an action to determine the
existence of a parent-child relationship, "it has no appli-
cation where, as here, it is undisputed that the defendant is
168. 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990).
169. Id. at 521.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 522.
175. Id. Section 7015 of the California Family Code provided that "[any
interested person may bring an action to determine the existence or
nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the
provisions of this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply."
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7015, repealed by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2001). Section
7650 continues former § 7015 without change.
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the natural mother of the child.",17 The court engaged in no
further discussion of the UPA, but implied by its ruling that
the maternity provision could apply only to a child's
biological mother. 17  The Curiale decision did not adequately
address the reality of the family unit before it, nor did it act
in the child's best interest in denying the lesbian coparent
legal recourse to maintain an existing parent-child
relationship.
Less than a year later, the California Court of Appeals
for the First District was presented with the issue of
whether the UPA conferred standing upon a lesbian
coparent seeking custody of her nonbiological children.
178
The parties in Nancy S. v. Michele G. began living together
in 1969 and had a commitment ceremony several months
later.179 The parties decided to have children and in June
1980, the respondent, Nancy S., gave birth to the parties'
first child, a daughter.8 ° Four years later, Nancy S. gave
birth to the parties' second child, a son.1" Both children
were given Michele G.'s family name and she was listed as
the "father" on both children's birth certificates. 2
A year after the birth of their son, the parties separated
and they agreed that their daughter would live with
Michele G. and that their son would live with Nancy S.83
They arranged visitation so that each party would have
primary care of one child for five days during the week, but
the children would be together, at either parent's home,
four days a week.' After three years, Nancy S. wanted to
change the agreement so that each parent would have
custody of both children 50% of the time, but Michele G.
opposed any change.'85 Nancy S. then commenced a
proceeding under the UPA, seeking a declaration that she
176. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
177. The California Supreme Court now recognizes that the term "mother"
under the UPA encompasses more than a biological mother and has opened the
door for lesbian coparent maternity adjudication. See discussion infra Part
III.B.2.
178. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
179. Id. at 214.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. By alternating with which parent the children reside, this
seemingly mathematical feat can indeed be accomplished.
185. Id.
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was entitled to sole legal and physical custody of the
children, that Michele G. was not a parent of either child,
and that Michele G. could visit the children only with her
consent.186
Michele G. conceded that she was not a biological or
adoptive "natural" parent under the UPA, but asserted that
the Act did not provide an exclusive definition of
parenthood and advanced several equitable theories
pursuant to which the court might consider her a parent: de
facto parenthood, in loco parentis, parenthood by equitable
estoppel, and functional parenthood.'87 Professor Robson
noted that "[aill of these theories supported the proposition
that Michelle [sic] G. should be deemed a parent, thereby
forestalling the operation of third party doctrine. " '
However, the Nancy S. court, concerned that application of
the doctrines would give Michele a parental status that did
not exist under California's statutory law refused to apply
equitable doctrines to protect Michele G.Y9 And, unlike the
courts discussed in Part II that were willing to apply
equitable doctrine to resolve at least the issue of visitation,
the Nancy S. court refused to apply any third party
doctrine, thereby denying Michele G. any legal right to
continue a parental relationship with her children. The
court's unwillingness to apply any one of four equitable
doctrines to Michele demonstrates its reluctance to move
beyond the one mother/one father paradigm and to view
family in terms of two same-sex parents.
Refusing to recognize Michele's parental status, the
court reinforced Michele's third party "legal stranger"
status in its application of each parental theory. The court
held that de facto parenthood and in loco parentis status do
not overcome the hurdles of parental autonomy, noting that
the doctrine of de facto parenthood is most often used if the
natural parent is unfit"'° and that the concept of in loco
186. Id. Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) has drafted
standards helpful for resolving custodial disputes between former same-sex
partners. GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, PROTECTING FAMILIES:
STANDARDS FOR CHILD CUSTODY IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS (1999), available at
http://www.glad.org/Publications/CivilRightProject/protectingfamilies.pdf.
187. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215-16.
188. Robson, supra note 37, at 1396.
189. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216-19.
190. Id. at 216. But see V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 2000)
(recognizing that someone who has acted as a psychological parent may assert a
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parentis has generally been used to impose certain rights
and obligations of legal parents on those in a parent-like
relationship with children, but had never been extended to
custodial disputes.' The court further noted that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel has generally been used to
preclude a man from denying paternity for the purpose of
avoiding his support obligations. 92 Although equitable
estoppel has also been used to preserve a parental relation-
ship in the absence of a biological tie, the court refused to
analogize the situation of the lesbian coparent with a
nonbiological putative father.'93 Finally, in refusing also to
recognize the notion of functional parenthood, the court
agreed that the absence of any legal formalization of
Michele's relationship with the children was "tragic," but it
refused to find that the Act permits an expansive definition
of parent-mainly out of concern that such an expansion
could "expose other natural parents to litigation brought by
child-care providers of long standing, relatives, successive
sets of stepparents or other close friends of the family."94
The court not only precluded the adjudication of a
mother and child relationship by finding that the four
equitable theories were inapplicable, it precluded Michele
G. from maintaining any parental relationship with her
children. Clearly, the court was concerned about the impact
its decision would have on the children involved, but it
refused to depart from a formalistic approach to statutory
construction.' Notably, as in Curiale, the Nancy S. court
custody and visitation claim even if she does not allege the biological parent's
unfitness).
191. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217 ("The concept of 'in loco parentis,'
however, has never been applied in a custody dispute to give a nonparent the
same rights as a parent, and we are unpersuaded that the concept should be so
extended.").
192. Id. at 217.
193. See id. at 217-18 (distinguishing equitable estoppel from an "equitable
parent" theory). The reluctance to apply doctrines such as estoppel to lesbian
coparents exemplifies the courts unwillingness to consider that a child may
have two parents of the same gender. See supra text accompanying notes 160-
63.
194. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
195. See id. ("By deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex
social and policy ramifications far beyond the facts of the particular case, we are
not telling the parties that the issues they raise are unworthy of legal
recognition. To the contrary, we intend only to illustrate the limitations of the
courts in fashioning a comprehensive solution to such a complex and socially
significant issue.").
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appeared wary of adjudicating the maternity of a
nonbiological mother. By finding no legal parental relation-
ship between Micah and Michele, the court denied Micah
his mother and forfeited his right to parental protection. As
noted in the preface to this article, Micah knew that he
continued to have a second mother and begged for her
protection after his accident. By denying Michele and Micah
any legalization of their relationship, the Nancy S. court's
decision made Micah an orphan-more of a tragedy than it
ever could have foreseen in its opinion.196
2. New Decision-Making for New Times. The California
Supreme Court opened the door to nonbiological maternity
adjudication in its 1993 decision, Johnson v. Calvert.'97 In
Johnson, the court was confronted with determining who is
a "mother" under California's version of the UPA, as
between the egg donor/genetic mother or the birth mother.
The court concluded that both women had a legitimate
factual basis upon which to assert their maternity'98 and
that both women "adduced evidence of a mother and child
relationship as contemplated by the Act." " Based on the
court's determination that both women could assert mater-
nity under the Act, the court reviewed the parties' intent to
determine who should be adjudicated the legal mother.
Because the genetic mother had, with her husband,
contracted for the birth mother to act as surrogate, the
court determined that the intent of the genetic mother to
actually parent the child was more compelling than the
196. Ultimately, Michele was able to convince social services workers in
Oklahoma to permit her to bring Micah home and she became his legal
guardian. See Herscher, supra note 1.
197. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); see also Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a couple who had arranged
for the birth of a child through donor insemination and a surrogate mother were
in fact the child's legal parents, despite the absence of any biological connection
to the child, because the child would not have been born "but for the efforts of
the intended parents") (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782).
198. The court found that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that one
woman gave birth to the child and one woman is genetically related to the child,
thus rendering both women "mother" under the Act. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.
199. Id. Concluding that both women had valid claims for maternity under
the Act, the court relied on California Civil Code section 7003, which provides in
relevant part, that between a child and the natural mother a parent and child
relationship "may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child,
or under [the Act]." Id. at 780 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (2001))
(emphasis added).
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surrogate's gestation of the child.200 The court specifically
noted that it declined to find that the child had two
mothers, because that would vest parental rights in a third
party and disrupt a "stable, intact, and nurturing home."2 1
As one author, however, has written:
[Tihe court left open the possibility that-faced with compelling
reasons-recognition of two mothers could be appropriate in some
future situation. In addition, it elevated intent of the parties over
literal interpretation of the statute, holding that 'intentions that
are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained for
ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.'
20 2
Attorneys Minter and Kendell of the National Center for
Lesbian Rights similarly agree that the parties' intentions
to coparent a child were of paramount importance in the
Johnson case and that intention to coparent provides a solid
foundation upon which lesbian coparents can seek
adjudication under the UPA. 03 In fact, several California
courts agree with this broader reading of the UPA: a
number of county courts have granted UPA petitions to
nonbiological lesbian coparents, thereby adjudicating their
legal motherhood.2 4
3. A State Supreme Court Recognizes the Applicability
of the Uniform Parentage Act to a Lesbian Coparent. In its
September 2000 decision in Rubano v. DiCenzo, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court became the first state court of last
resort to approve the use of the UPA as a means of
exercising jurisdiction over a lesbian coparent dispute and
adjudicating maternity for a lesbian coparent. °5 Although
at the trial court level the lesbian coparent petitioner
waived her claim seeking adjudication of a mother and child
200. Id. at 781-82.
201. Id. at 781 n.8.
202. Doskow, supra note 57, at 18 (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783).
203. See Minter & Kendell, supra note 50, at 41-42. The authors have
prepared a model brief which contains a good analysis of how courts,
particularly those in California, can use Johnson to adjudicate maternity for
lesbian coparents. Id. at 38-47. In their model brief, the authors argue that
under the holding in Johnson, a lesbian coparent is a lawful parent because she
consented to the biological mother's artificial insemination in order "to bring
about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own." Id. at 38.
204. Id. at 32.
205. 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
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relationship, the Rubano court noted in its decision that the
petitioner could have so requested, thus opening the door to
lesbian coparent adjudication and a more definite
resolution of lesbian coparent disputes."6 Rubano marks a
significant step forward in lesbian coparent jurisprudence,
by recognizing that a nonbiological or nonadoptive mother
can be adjudicated a legal parent nonetheless.
The parties in Rubano, Maureen Rubano and Concetta
DiCenzo, entered into a committed relationship in 1988.207
Eventually, they set up a household as domestic partners
and in 1991 they decided to have and raise a child
together.20 8 The parties decided that DiCenzo would be
artificially inseminated, and in 1992 she gave birth to a son
whose last name was listed on both his birth and baptismal
certificates as Rubano-DiCenzo. 29 Rubano never adopted
him, but for four years the couple coparented the child."0 In
1996, the couple separated and the parties established an
informal visitation schedule for Rubano to see her son. But
by 1997, DiCenzo opposed the visits and Rubano filed a
petition in family court seeking to establish her de facto
parental status and to obtain court-ordered visitation.21'
After Rubano filed the lawsuit, and subsequent to the
appointment and recommendations of a guardian ad litem,
the parties negotiated a consent order which provided that
Rubano was to have permanent visitation with her child in
exchange for which she agreed to waive any claim she had
or may have to recognition as a parent of her son. 12 Their
agreement was subsequently entered as an order of the
206. Id. at 967. The court stated:
[T]he plain language of this provision of the ULP [Rhode Island version
of the UPA] vests the Family Court with jurisdiction to declare the
existence vel non of a mother and child relationship in these limited
circumstances.... Indeed, if the parties had chosen to litigate this
issue rather than to settle their dispute and if the facts were contrary
to what Rubano had alleged, the ULP expressly allowed for a finding
that no mother and child relationship existed between Rubano and the
child; but, in any event, there is no question but that § 15-8-26 [of the
ULPI gives the Family Court jurisdiction to determine whether such a
relationship exists in cases like this one.
Id. (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 961.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 961-62.
212. Id. at 962.
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family court.213 Soon thereafter, DiCenzo allegedly violated
the visitation agreement again and Rubano sought
contempt relief under the family court order.214 DiCenzo
countered that the family court could not enforce the
visitation order because the court had lacked jurisdiction to
enter the order in the first place."5
The Rhode Island Supreme Court disagreed, and held
that Rubano had several remedies available to her and that
the family court indeed had jurisdiction to hear Rubano's
complaint for contempt as well as her initial petition.1 6
First, and most importantly, the court held that the family
court had jurisdiction to hear Rubano's original petition to
determine the existence of a de facto parental relationship
under section 15-8-26 of Rhode Island's Uniform Law on
Paternity ("ULP").217 Section 15-8-26 provides that "[a]ny
interested party may bring an action to determine the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child
relationship.21' 8 The court found that Rubano qualified as
an interested party because she claimed that she had a de
facto parental relationship with her son. 19 Second, in
addition to the maternity provision of the ULP, the Rubano
court concluded that Rubano was entitled to pursue her
visitation claim under the state's general paternity
statute.220 The court also concluded that Rubano had a claim
against DiCenzo for violating the parties' visitation
agreement.
In recognizing Rubano's right to pursue her claim under
section 15-8-26, the court made several important legal
conclusions. Unlike the California courts in Curiale and
Michele G., the Rubano court acknowledged that a
biological connection to a child is not a prerequisite to
seeking a maternity adjudication under the maternity
213. Id.
214. Id. at 962-63.
215. Id. at 963.
216. Id. at 966.
217. Rhode Island's Uniform Law on Paternity is a hybrid version of the
Uniform Act on Paternity and the Uniform Parentage Act. Rubano, 759 A.2d at
966.
218. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-8-26 (2000) (emphasis added); Rubano, 759 A.2d at
966. Section 15-8-26 adopts verbatim the language of the maternity provision
contained in section 21 of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act.
219. 759 A.2d at 966-67 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3).
220. Id. at 970.
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provision of the ULP (or the UPA).21 Relying on its previous
decision in Pettinato v. Pettinato,222 the Rubano court noted
that the family court has the power to determine the
existence of a de facto parent-child relationship, despite the
absence of a biological connection between the child and
putative parent.2 3 The court ruled that "any interested
party" under section 15-8-26 may include a person "who,
though he or she has no biological connection with a child,
nonetheless has functioned as a parent in relation to that
child and has been held out to the community as the child's
parent by the biological parent."224
The Rubano court engaged in a critical analysis of
section 15-8-26, the language of which is identical to the
UPA 1973 maternity provision. The court specifically noted
that while other provisions of the parentage act include
various forms of limiting language,"5 section 15-8-26
contains no such limiting provisions, "thereby allowing a
nonbiological parent to establish the existence of a de facto
mother-child relationship with the child."2 ' The dissent's
contention was that the ULP's maternity provision was
enacted solely for the rare case where a young child may
not know his or her mother and that it does not permit
someone who already knows who a child's biological mother
is "to intrude upon an already established biological mother
and child relationship." In contrast, the majority found no
such limiting language within section 15-8-26:121
[f the General Assembly had intended to permit only a biological
mother or a child living with a single father or in a foster home to
bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and child
relationship, we are of the opinion that it would have said so
instead of using the broader term "[any interested party." A
biological connection with either the mother or the child is but one
221. Id. at 968.
222. 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990) (awarding custodial rights of minor child to
nonbiological father based upon his status as a de facto parent).
223. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 967.
224. Id. at 969. The court specifically noted that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel barred DiCenzo from asserting that Rubano's lack of a biological tie to
the child was fatal to Rubano's claim for legal recognition of her rights as a de
facto parent. Id. at 968.
225. For example, the court referred to section 15-8-3(a), which delineates
specific circumstances under which a man is presumed to be a child's natural
father. Id.
226. Id. at 969.
227. Id. at 980 (Bourcier, J. dissenting).
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potential source of an interest sufficient to confer standing on a
person seeking to obtain a judicial determination concerning the
existence of a mother-child relationship. Thus... the language of
§ 15-8-26 does not specifically limit its scope to those interested in
determining a biological mother-and-child relationship.
228
Thus, in Rubano, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
became the first court of last resort to recognize what the
broad language of the UPA allows: a lesbian coparent with
no biological or adoptive connection to her child may indeed
be a legal parent under the statute and proceed with a
petition to establish maternity.
However, although the court noted that "any interested
party" may petition to establish the existence of a mother
and child relationship, it narrowly construed "any
interested party," requiring an alleged parent-like relation-
ship with the child before relief can be granted.229 While this
may appear to implicate the problems noted in the third
party equitable doctrine cases, the significant difference
between the cases is clear: the basis for standing, namely
the UPA. In the equitable doctrine cases, the issues of
standing and proof of a parent-like relationship were
inextricably intertwined, resulting in an unclear process
and result. Under a Rubano analysis, however, while the
lesbian coparent must establish a parent-like relationship
to sustain her maternity claim, it appears she need only
disclose in the petition that she has such a relationship; she
can prove the merits of her parental relationship as part of
her case-in-chief seeking a maternity determination.
Furthermore, the context in which she must establish
her de facto parental status differs between Rubano and the
previous third party equitable doctrine cases. Rubano
definitely suggests that proof of a de facto parental
relationship can result in an adjudication of maternity; the
third party equitable doctrine cases merely allowed for
ongoing visitation upon proof of a de facto parental
relationship. As previously discussed, maternity adjudica-
tion greatly impacts other considerations, such as custody
228. Id. at 969-70 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 967. In clarifying its narrow interpretation of "any interested
party," the court distinguishes its decision in Rubano from the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), which held that a
Washington statute that permitted "any person" to petition for visitation at
"any time" was unconstitutionally broad.
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and visitation, and creates a legal parity between the
parties that third party doctrine cannot. Moreover, mater-
nity adjudication provides the greatest security for the child
of a lesbian coparent.
Rubano does not stand for the proposition that third
party equitable doctrine should be completely overlooked.
As discussed above, Rubano must prove her de facto
parental status in order to be adjudicated as a legal parent
under section 15-8-26. Thus, traditional third party
equitable doctrines still play an integral role in a maternity
adjudication, because they provide a means for evaluating
the parental role that a lesbian coparent has played in the
life of her child; however, this evaluation occurs within a
parental analytic framework. Rubano did not begin from
the premise that the biological parent is the only parent
and that the lesbian coparent is a legal stranger. Instead,
the court properly treated both parties as parents within its
analysis. In recognizing the maternity claim of the lesbian
coparent, the Rubano court recognizes the societal trend of
"two mommy" households and is not constrained by
traditional norms of one mother/one father.
In fact, the Rubano court further demonstrated its
willingness to look beyond the one mother/one father
parentage model by determining that the general paternity
statute conferred standing for Rubano's visitation claim.
That statute grants jurisdiction to the family court over
"those matters relating to adults who shall be involved with
paternity of children born out of wedlock."3 ° The court
noted that the statute equally applied to two women:
While the word 'paternity' implies the 'fathering' of a child, we are
mindful of the Legislature's instruction that when statutes are
construed '[e]very word importing the masculine gender only, may
be construed to extend to and to include females as well as males.'
Thus, two women may certainly be 'adults who shall be involved
231with paternity' of a child for purposes of this statute.
The court found that Rubano was most certainly
involved with the "paternity" of the child, based on the facts
recounted above. Although the court did not indicate that
the general provisions of the paternity statute confer
standing to adjudicate maternity for Rubano, the provision
230. Rubano, 759 A.2d. at 970.
231. Id. at 971 n.13 (citation omitted).
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does provide a statutory basis for standing upon which she
could proceed with her visitation claim. Thus, unlike the
Holtzman, VC., and E.N.O. courts, which applied third
party doctrine to exercise standing and to resolve the
substantive dispute, Rubano found a statutory predicate for
Rubano's visitation claim and clarified the issue of
standing. Thus, the Rubano court became the first state
court of last resort to fully acknowledge the potentiality for
applying the UPA to lesbian coparents, both as an
adjudication mechanism and a basis for exercising
jurisdiction of lesbian coparent disputes.
CONCLUSION
Other courts should follow the example of Rubano and
use the UPA to adjudicate maternity for lesbian coparents.
Unlike third party equitable doctrines, use of the UPA fully
resolves the issue of a lesbian coparent's legal parent status
and simultaneously provides clarity concerning her stand-
ing to maintain her claim. The UPA provides a consistent,
uniform means for enabling a lesbian coparent to achieve
full, legal parental status, which protects her and her child.
In filing a maternity complaint, petitioners will not run
afoul of constitutional presumptions of parental autonomy;
they will not need to allege that the biological parent is
unfit. Instead, a lesbian coparent can assert that she has a
parental relationship with her child and use equitable
doctrines as a means of proving her parentage within a
parental analytic framework, rather than as a last-ditch
effort to illustrate a quasi-parental relationship which may
recognize only some aspects of parentage.
In this way, the UPA better establishes parity between
the lesbian coparent and biological mother than either a
second-parent adoption or a traditional equity complaint,
because under a UPA complaint, the petitioner argues that
she is a parent to her child, not that she has assumed a
quasi-parental role in the child's life.232 Essentially, this
type of proceeding puts lesbian coparents on a par with men
engaged in paternity proceedings and parents engaged in
divorce proceedings: the focus is properly placed on
determining how much visitation or contact with the
lesbian coparent serves the child's best interests, rather
232. See Doskow, supra note 57, at 21.
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than whether any contact with the lesbian coparent serves
the child's best interests or whether such contact violates
the biological mother's parental rights."'3
Maternity adjudication under the UPA also preempts
many of the problems noted in the cases discussed above. If
lesbian coparents had a legal acknowledgment of their
parental status prior to the dissolution of their relationship,
it would be simpler to establish the jurisdictional basis for
filing a custody and visitation complaint.234 Courts in Los
Angeles, San Luis Obispo, and San Francisco counties in
California as well as courts in Colorado and Massachusetts
have granted UPA petitions to establish a legal relationship
between lesbian coparents and their children, thereby
protecting the relationship between a lesbian coparent and
her child even if the lesbian coparent and her partner end
their romantic relationship. 5
Moreover, under the UPA, lesbian coparents (or
biological mothers) need not initiate an adversarial
proceeding: for instance, parties can file a written voluntary
acknowledgment of parentage with the court in lieu of filing
a complaint, which would have the same force and effect as
an adjudication of maternity.3 6 Filing a maternity petition
provides absolute protection of the child-parent relationship
between the child and her lesbian coparent, now legal
parent. From a practical standpoint, then, adjudication
233. Minter and Kendell note that:
[W]hile lesbian and gay parents who obtain second-parent adoptions
are relieved to have some means of protecting their children, many also
resent the notion that it is necessary for one of the partners to adopt
the child to obtain legal recognition as a parent, despite the fact that
both partners have planned the birth of the child and assumed co-equal
responsibilities for parenting.
Minter & Kendell, supra note 50, at 30.
234. In all of the lesbian coparent cases discussed, a maternity adjudication
for the lesbian coparent prior to the dissolution of her relationship with her
romantic partner would have enabled her to proceed with her custody and
visitation claims without need for a determination of her right to proceed; her
legal parentage would have automatically given her that right.
235. See Doskow, supra note 57, at 21; Minter & Kendell, supra note 50, at
33 nn.27-28.
236. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 11(a) (West 1998). In
addition to the acknowledgment of parentage, the parties can also file a
parenting agreement, which reflects their intentions concerning support,
custody, visitation, and the like. Id. For purposes of establishing maternity, a
coparenting agreement further exemplifies to the court the parties' joint
intention to create a "two mommies" family.
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under the UPA is advantageous for lesbian coparents
because they can,quickly and cheaply resolve the issue of
legal parenthood.!
7
Most significantly, children benefit from lesbian
coparent maternity adjudication too. By establishing
maternity, a lesbian coparent will be able to ensure all of
the privileges and protections of parenthood for her child,
such as financial benefits-support, inheritance, health
insurance-and emotional benefits-a legal ability to get
involved in her child's educational, medical, moral, and
religious development. Thus, maternity adjudication under
the UPA will give children of lesbian parents, like Micah,
two mommies who can protect and care for them and will
ensure that children are not separated from the lesbian
coparents who love them.
237. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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